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Abstract The article explores the “what” and the “how” of design re-
search. It discusses the epistemological assumptions of design and design 
research—the conception of true knowledge that underpins the quest to 
advance design knowledge through research. The article also examines the 
media and methods of doing design research—that is, the “how” of such 
research. As it developed over the past century, the design field has drawn 
extensively on three pivotal but often tacitly deployed epistemologies: the 
Platonic-Aristotelian, the pragmatic, and the postmodern. Platonic episte-
mology is latent in many commonplace design instruction texts. Pragmatic 
epistemology underscores the industrial-arts ethos of design. Postmodern 
epistemologies dominate in university programs—especially graduate and 
Ph.D. programs. The article considers how these competing epistemologies 
understand the role of imagination in the act of creation. The article then 
considers the role of explanation in the carrying out of research in creative 
design and arts fields. It addresses whether, and to what degree, design 
research ought to rely on explanatory words as its principal medium of 
research, or whether it is valid to substitute artifactual creation for intellec-
tual explanation in the research process.
Copyright © 2017, Tongji University and Tongji University Press.  
Publishing services by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the  
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
The peer review process is the responsibility of Tongji University and Tongji University Press.
 
http://www.journals.elsevier.com/she-ji-the-journal-of-design-economics-and-innovation 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sheji.2017.09.002
Aesthetic Epistemology and Explanatory Knowledge
118 she ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation      Volume 3, Number 2, Summer 2017
Introduction
When we design, we shape things. We do so in order that things in the world work 
better, harder, and faster; more efficiently, elegantly, and gorgeously; with better 
fit and ease of use, and so on. But what about design research? What does it add 
to the primordial desideratum of design? Research advances knowledge. How does 
this apply to design research? What knowledge does it produce? And how does it 
produce such knowledge? 
The kind of knowledge design research produces in practice—the what of 
design research—results from the tacit theory of knowledge, or epistemology, that 
each researcher has. There is not just an epistemology of design, however—there 
are several. Each provides a set of philosophical underpinnings for design research 
and the knowledge it creates. Epistemologies are contentious by nature—they offer 
competing worldviews. In practice, design scholars rarely consult the source epis-
temologies. The dicta that circulate in the world of researchers provide summaries 
and epistemological assumptions that researchers adopt without even being espe-
cially aware of the origins or full implications of the theories of knowledge they 
implicitly rely on. 
Design shapes things in the world, while epistemologies shape things in the 
realm of knowledge. Epistemologies outline what true knowledge (valid, legiti-
mate, genuine knowledge) looks like, and enable us to account for the point, pur-
pose, and meanings of the knowledge we acquire. Epistemologies shape knowledge 
acquisition and advancement by providing criteria of true and false knowledge. 
Aesthetic epistemologies do this for design knowledge. Once a stock of design 
knowledge accumulates, it has a second-hand effect—its shape starts to affect the 
shape of design practice. That accumulated stock filters down from epistemology 
to knowledge, and from knowledge to doing. The sequence begins with aesthetic 
epistemologies. These design design-knowledge by establishing expectations and 
patterns for it. The stock of knowledge that follows, and its epistemological presup-
positions, shapes design work and outcomes in turn. In other words, epistemolo-
gies design the act of designing. This shaping occurs subtly, quietly, and implicitly 
in the background of design work. All design—no matter how practical its focus—
relies on some tacit notion of true knowledge that gives it its recognizable shape 
and form. 
The what of design research gives us an account of the “design-i-ness” or shape 
of design research. It gives insight into the purpose and meaning of the research—
what its reason-for-being is. But design research, having addressed the question of 
its purpose or point, then has to address the issue of how it is conducted. What are 
its compelling methods, approaches, and media? From this starting point, a further 
series of questions unfolds. When an instance of design research is undertaken, the 
researcher has to consider several approaches. What is the best medium to use? 
What are the most appropriate tools for undertaking the research? All research 
is aimed at advancing knowledge. So how, then, do we best go about advancing 
design knowledge? 
A key issue in design research is the media of research. This reflects the fact 
that design work is mostly an artifactual activity. It shapes three-dimensional, 
two-dimensional, and sometimes even one-dimensional objects. It posits these 
in the world. In so doing, it enhances the efficiency, structure, and beauty of the 
world. This contrasts with research, which is normally undertaken through the 
medium of explanatory words and texts. It is usually not done by arranging colors 
and textures, contours and voids, and the like. The question then arises: is design 
research properly objectivated in theses, treatises, and books? Or is it, ideally, best 
posited in design artifacts? That is to say, is design research principally an act of 
making or is it one of explanation? Does the design researcher mainly engage in an 
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act of reasoning? Or, alternatively, in an act of production? Is the research object 
that is created most compelling when it is an assemblage of words? Or when it is 
an assemblage of materials? 
The Aesthetic Epistemology of the Imagination
Design achieves its most remarkable effects by mobilizing the imagination. The 
imagination, a cognitive faculty, parses the world around it into contrary qualities 
and forces—large and small, hot and cold, bright and dull, animated and tranquil, 
up and down, near and far, and so on. The imagination is the intellectual medium 
that enables these antonyms to become synonyms. It synthesizes antitheses. It 
turns difference into likeness and disparity into similarity. It unifies oppositions 
and does so in pleasing and striking ways. 
How does the imagination manage this? Firstly through the organizing power 
of form. Proportion, harmony, balance, rhythm, and symmetry are among the 
principal means that enable the human mind to structure relationships between 
antipodal qualities so that they appear to us as being somehow just right. The imag-
ination also deploys the structural power of analogy. Similes, metaphors, allegories, 
and symbols create resemblances out of things that are experienced as dissimilar. 
Form and analogy operate through multiple mediums—linguistic, visual, auditory, 
tactile, and so on. The imagination creates equivalences out of things that are not 
equivalent and comparisons out of what seems incommensurable. It produces unity 
out of opposition and forges meaning by translating the terms of one thing into 
those of another. 
The epistemology of the imagination is not—and never has been—the only 
aesthetic epistemology in circulation. Nevertheless, it has been commonplace from 
antiquity to modernity. Its primary competitors in the twentieth century were 
pragmatic and, later, postmodern epistemologies. John Dewey gave the definitive 
account of pragmatic epistemology in the 1920s and 1930s. The postmodern wave 
arrived in the 1970s. 
The aesthetic epistemology of the imagination is rooted in two ultimate 
sources. One of them is the Pre-Socratic and Platonic view of creation.1 This looks 
on creation as a union of opposites achieved through the power of forms. The 
second source is Aristotle, for whom creation is the work of analogies that create 
resemblances between unlike things.2 In both cases—form and metaphor—human 
cognition is able to perceive that A stands to B as B stands to C. The epistemological 
theory of this percolated from classical antiquity via various threads of Stoicism, 
Platonism, and Aristotelianism down to the Renaissance and beyond. Strong paral-
lels also exist in the East Asian traditions of Taoism and Zen Buddhism. 
By the sixteenth century, many Europeans had begun to use the word imag-
ination to denote the cognitive processing faculty that performed the kinds of 
gymnastic analogical and patterning operations that underpin the uncanny equiv-
alences that distinguish the act of creation. The epistemology of the imagination 
evolved from Francis Bacon’s power of perceiving resemblances and Shakespeare’s 
faculty that “bodies forth the forms of things unknown,”3 through the “wit” of 
John Dryden, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke, to Joseph Addison’s pleasures of 
the imagination and Alexander Pope’s dangerous art. William Hazlitt thought that 
the imagination was the faculty for finding “something similar in things generally 
alike,” while wit was what allowed us to find something the same where we least 
expected it “in things totally opposite.”4 
Denis Diderot pointed to the paradox of great actors who do not feel the emo-
tions that they act out. Johann Gottfried Herder emphasized the allegorical, met-
aphorical, and symbolic structure of archaic myth and legend. Friedrich Schlegel 
1 Peter Murphy, Civic Justice: 
From Greek Antiquity to the 
Modern World (Amherst: 
Humanity Books, 2001), 45–78.
2 “Metaphor consists in giving 
the thing a name that belongs to 
something else…” Aristotle, The 
Poetics, trans. Ingram Bywater 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1920), 1457 b6–9. 
3 William Shakespeare, A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, 
ed. Harold F. Brooks (London: 
Metheuen Publishing, 1979), 163.
4 William Hazlitt, “On Wit and 
Humor,” in Selected Essays of 
William Hazlett 1778 to 1830, 
ed. Geoffrey Keynes (Whitefish: 
Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 436.
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pointed to the inverted, ironic ways the self was able to imagine itself. For Johann 
Fichte, the imagination was dialectical—a synthesis of thesis and antithesis. For 
Samuel Coleridge, the imagination balanced opposite and discordant qualities—
sameness and difference, novelty and familiarity, steadiness and enthusiasm, the 
natural and the artificial. Ralph Waldo Emerson likewise thought that oppositions 
were pervasive and that the moments that make nature, society, and art interesting 
and powerful occur when contrasting forces—such as those of asceticism and busi-
ness, fate and freedom, nearness and farness, shadow and light—are reconciled.5 
Emerson’s contemporary Søren Kierkegaard argued that it was God’s nature to join 
opposites and that the Christian apostles were called to paradox.6 G.K. Chesterton 
agreed. For him also, creation was an act of paradox—two opposite things whose 
combination seemed impossible or absurd, and yet on reflection was valid or true. 
Heinrich Wölfflin defined classic art as composition by contrasts.7 Simone 
Weil saw proportionality as the way in which the inherent contradictoriness of the 
world was resolved.8 The aesthetic theory of the mid-twentieth century New Critics 
stressed that literature operated through the media of irony and paradox.9 I.A. 
Richards defined the act of imagination as equilibrium.10 Arthur Koestler defined it 
as the merger of two ostensibly incompatible frames of reference.11 Albert Rothen-
berg dubbed it Janus-like in its style of thinking.12 Antithetical images and concepts 
coalesce in the imagination. Robert Grudin observed how the Renaissance imagina-
tion was permeated by paradoxes, the symbiosis of opposites.13 Joshua Wolf Shenk 
dubbed this symbiosis the overlapping of connected opposites.14 Shenk’s sense 
that everything is the opposite in the realm of the creative imagination effectively 
brought the intuition of the imagination back to its very beginning. More than two 
millennia ago, Plato stated in the Phaedo that all opposites are generated out of one 
another and that there is a passing or process from one to the other.15
Unlike the disciplines of literature, painting and architecture, the field of 
design has produced little in the way of explicit aesthetic epistemology. A rare 
exception to this rule is Mads Nygaard Folkmann’s The Aesthetics of Imagination in 
Design.16 In it, Folkmann explores the coexistence and intersection of dichoto-
mies—such as tactile material and immaterial structures—in the design process. 
His overarching claim is that design objects will always be both at the same time.17 
The synesthetic concept of being both at the same time is, arguably, as good a defi-
nition of the creative imagination as any. The imagination is a cognitive coalescent. 
Through an exchange between poles, it conjoins subject and object, inside and 
outside.18
How, exactly, does this exchange work? That query is an epistemological one, 
and also a practical one. The question is answered implicitly in numerous practical 
design texts—notably those that treat design as a kind of demotic Platonic geom-
etry. This vernacular design Platonism embedded itself in early twentieth-century 
art education, and later on in design education, almost without being noticed. It 
was interpolated in many popular design handbooks. These are practical, instruc-
tional works, yet they incorporate—often to a high degree—numerous classical 
theoretical concepts. In these works, theories of balance, proportion, and sym-
metry, and related qualities—beauty, order, contrast, economy, elegance, integra-
tion, ratio, rhythm, synesthesia, and unity—play key pedagogic roles. This low-key, 
instructional design Platonism begins with Arthur Wesley Dow’s Composition.19 It is 
followed by a steady stream of textbooks including those by Denham Waldo Ross, 
Belle Boas, Walter Dorwin Teague, Gyorgy Kepes, Victor D’Amico, Paul Jacques 
Grillo, Amy Arntson, and Alex White (see Table 1).20
5 Peter Murphy, “Nature’s God: 
Emerson and the Greeks,” Thesis 
Eleven 93, no. 1 (2008): 64–71. 
6 See especially “Christian 
Discourses,” “Two Ethical-Reli-
gious Essays,” and “Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript to 
Philosophical Fragments,” in 
Søren Kierkegaard, The Essential 
Kierkegaard, ed. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 
2000). 
7 Heinrich Wölfflin, Classic Art: 
An Introduction to the Italian 
Renaissance (London: Phaidon, 
1952), 258.
8 Weil’s notebooks were written 
in Marseilles in 1941 and 1942, 
and posthumously published in 
an English-language edition in 
two volumes as The Notebooks 
of Simone Weil. Simone Weil, The 
Notebooks of Simone Weil, vol. 1 
(London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1956), 31. 
9 In many ways, William 
Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks’s 
Literary Criticism: A Short History 
was a summation-to-date of a 
long tradition of aesthetic epis-
temologies of the imagination. 
William K. Wimsatt and Cleanth 
Brooks, Literary Criticism: A Short 
History (New York: Vintage, 
1957). 
10 Ivor A. Richards, Principles of 
Literary Criticism (London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1964).
11 Arthur Koestler, The Act of 
Creation (London: Pan, 1970). 
12 Albert Rothenberg, The 
Emerging Goddess: The Creative 
Process in Art, Science and Other 
Fields (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1979).
13 Robert Grudin, Mighty 
Opposites: Shakespeare and 
Renaissance Contrariety (Berke-
ley: University of California 
Press, 1979).
14 Joshua W. Shenk, Powers 
of Two: Finding the Essence of 
Innovation in Creative Pairs (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 
2014).
15 Plato, “Phaedo,” in The 
Trial and Death of Socrates: 
Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin 
Jowett (New York: Dover, 1992), 
64–138.
16 Mads N. Folkmann, The 
Aesthetics of Imagination in 
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Table 1. Synthesizing principles (Platonic).
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Dow, Composition (1899) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓
Ross, A Theory of Pure Design (1907) ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓
Boas, Art in the School (1924)  ✓  ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓
Teague, Design This Day (1940) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Kepes, Language of Vision (1944)  ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  
D’Amico, Creative Teaching in Art (1947)  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  
Grillo, Form Function and Design (1960) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
Arnston, Graphic Design Basics (1988)  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
White, The Elements of Graphic Design (2002) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Equilibrium = Equilibrium or Union of Contrasts, Oppositions, Antitheses; 
Order = Order or Arrangement; 
Simplicity = Simplicity, clarity, directness.
Vernacular Platonic design pedagogy has a large pool of theoretical tools avail-
able to it. These hardy, nuts-and-bolts concepts were developed over two millennia 
of philosophical thought and practical application. Design manuals rooted tacitly 
in the classic epistemology of the imagination rarely use all of the concepts that 
it affords. Rather, each writer selects key concepts and weaves these into a distinc-
tive personal design approach. Each of their works is transient in its own way, but 
their conceptual underpinnings are timeless. Each pedagogy offers a new angle on 
the age-old challenge of composition. Ultimately, the underlying metaphysics of 
how to approach design today is not that much different from what Iktinos and 
Kallikrates—and after them, Vitruvius and Palladio—relied on. Across the twen-
tieth century, the same unspoken Platonic epistemological toolkit handsomely 
served Dow’s Emersonian pastoralism, Teague’s machine-age American industri-
alism, Kepes’ European modernism, and Grillo’s organicism.
In contrast, the Aristotelian paradigm of design by metaphor played a rel-
atively muted role in twentieth-century pedagogic handbooks. In the latter half 
of the century, it grew in influence. But it did so principally in scholarly, re-
search-driven works such as Evelyn Hatcher’s Visual Metaphors, Barbara Stafford’s 
Visual Analogy, and Douglas Hofstadter’s I Am a Strange Loop.21 Research has a trick-
le-down effect, so by the time Alex White’s popular handbook The Elements of Graphic 
Design came out in 2002, Aristotelian themes of analogy, similarity, and resem-
blance had begun to supplement the durable Platonic conceptual kit. The merger of 
Platonic and Aristotelian aesthetic epistemology was first introduced in mid-twen-
tieth-century scholarship. The confluence of Platonic proportion and Aristotelian 
analogy is outlined in Umberto Eco’s 1959 work Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages.22 
Author-architect Peter F. Smith developed another, more contemporary version 
of this in Architecture and the Human Dimension.23 Smith made an eloquent case for 
the combination of a first-order aesthetics of balance and equilibrium with a sec-
ond-order aesthetics of rhyme, which he defined as likeness tempered with differ-
ence.24 There are various ways of achieving the paradox of the same-but-different 
aesthetic rhyme— symbolism, iconicity, analogy, metaphor, echoing, allegory, and 
simile. 
Design (Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press, 2013).
17 Ibid., xv.
18 Ibid., xv, 8.
19 Arthur W. Dow, Composition: 
A Series of Exercises in Art 
Structure for the Use of Students 
and Teachers, facsimile edition 
(1899; Stockbridge: HardPress 
Publishing, 2012). 
20 Denman W. Ross, A Theory of 
Pure Design: Harmony, Balance, 
Rhythm, facsimile edition 
(1907; Stockbridge: HardPress 
Publishing, 2012); Belle Boas, 
Art in the School (New York: 
Doubleday and Doren, 1924); 
Walter D. Teague, Design This 
Day: The Technique of Order 
in the Machine Age (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940); 
Gyorgy Kepes, Language of 
Vision, rev. ed. (1944; New York: 
Dover, 1995); Victor D’Amico, 
Creative Teaching in Art, rev. ed. 
(1947; Scranton: International 
Textbook, 1967); Paul J. Grillo, 
Form, Function, and Design (New 
York: Dover, 1975), originally 
published as What is Design? 
(Minneapolis: P. Theobald, 1960); 
Amy E. Arntson, Graphic Design 
Basics, 6th ed. (Boston: Wad-
sworth, 2012); Alex W. White, 
The Elements of Graphic Design: 
Space, Unity, Page Architecture, 
and Type, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Allworth Press, 2011).
21 Evelyn P. Hatcher, Visual 
Metaphors: A Methodological 
Study in Visual Communication 
(1974; Albuquerque: University 
of New Mexico Press, 1989); 
Barbara M. Stafford, Visual 
Analogy: Consciousness as the 
Art of Connecting, rev. ed. (1999; 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001); 
Douglas Hofstadter, I Am a 
Strange Loop (New York: Basic 
Books, 2007).
22 Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty 
in the Middle Ages, trans. Hugh 
Bredin (1959; New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1986).
23 Peter F. Smith, Architecture 
and the Human Dimension 
(Westfield: Eastview Editions, 
1979).
24 Ibid, 54, 218.
Aesthetic Epistemology and Explanatory Knowledge
122 she ji The Journal of Design, Economics, and Innovation      Volume 3, Number 2, Summer 2017
White observes that the search for similarities lies at the heart of what a 
designer does.25 The imagination is the mental machine that finds similarities in 
things that outwardly appear to be conspicuously different. This is why, as White 
puts it, design can take a good deal of time. Such similarities do not immediately 
present themselves.26 In creative design, Platonic geometries are one of the means 
of making seemingly dissimilar things—such as big and small, hot and cold, repe-
tition and change—into similar things. Analogy, metaphor, and simile do approxi-
mately the same. As both Plato and Aristotle concluded, thinking by ratio allows us 
to equate things that otherwise are unlike each other.27 Comparably, the faculty of 
the imagination makes what is dissimilar similar. Ratio and metaphor both allow 
us to conceive of one thing in terms of another. In so doing, they create effects that 
are humorous, uncanny, surprising, unexpected, or enigmatic. That, in turn, means 
that they create things that are memorable. 
Pragmatic and Postmodern Aesthetic Epistemologies
The aesthetic epistemology of the imagination is one kind of aesthetic episte-
mology. There are others. In the past century, there have been two key challenges 
to the classic model of the imagination—one from the epistemology of pragma-
tism, the other from the epistemology of postmodernism. The former emerged 
from the philosophical writings of John Dewey in the 1920s and 1930s, the latter 
from a variety of Continental philosophies—most notably that of Jacques Derrida. 
The influence of postmodernism spread widely after 1970, especially in the universi-
ties. For a time, it pushed to one side both Platonic and pragmatic epistemologies.  
Pragmatism’s key epistemological category is that of experience. Dewey 
argued that in a fully formed experience, human beings complete a course of 
action. They begin with an end-in-view. They define a project, organize materials, 
plan the expected outcome using abstract symbols, and coordinate the means 
to achieve the end. To do so successfully, they have to forge effective unions of 
opposites. To realize their goals, people have to combine the “precarious, novel, 
irregular with the settled, assured and uniform.”28 Such combinations are not easy. 
Dewey observed that, in fact, much of ordinary human experience is inchoate and 
fragmented. It does not achieve solvent unions. It cannot reconcile the contingent 
with the continuous or the conspicuous with the hidden. It is unable to square 
stability with uncertainty. Consequently, it does not manage much in the way of 
consummation. 
Dewey reckoned that the experience of creating an artwork, in contrast, is 
cohesive and integrated. It represents experience in the strongest sense. It ends 
in a consummation—a completed artwork. To get to that point, each part of the 
artwork and the art process has to fit together. The experience may involve un-
dergoing or suffering—as opposing parts are gradually resolved into a whole and 
means are adjusted to an end-in-view. But suffering is overcome by doing. The 
result—the consummation—is fulfilling. Fulfillment, however, does not last. Soon, 
the artist begins a new work, and the process starts all over again. In important 
ways, Dewey’s pragmatism was a philosophy of production. The spell of the Cal-
vinist work ethic lay behind it.29 It conceived human action as a kind of productive 
effort. This extended to the arts. 
In Experience and Nature, Dewey defined art as a process of production.30 The 
ancient Greeks, he argued, thought that the arts existed principally for apprecia-
tion and contemplation. The arts, he agreed, do have an important taste dimension. 
Audiences and critics, buyers and consumers alike are appreciative. They respond 
to the aesthetics of design works. But, of necessity, appreciation has to be preceded 
by productivity and creativity.31 The fine arts, Dewey thought, prioritized aesthetic 
25 White, The Elements of 
Graphic Design, 9. 
26 Ibid, 9.
27 This is the ultimate root of 
the widespread contemporary 
business practice of managing 
by ratios.
28 John Dewey, Experience and 
Nature (1929; New York: Dover, 
1958), 358.
29 As Ken Friedman has noted, 
“Transcendentalism’s emphasis 
on experience as the basis 
for philosophy evolved into 
pragmatism toward the end of 
the 1800s in New England. John 
Dewey, George Herbert Mead, 
and Charles Sanders Peirce 
were born in New England, and 
William James spent much of 
his life there. Related to the 
Puritan Calvinist tradition 
through Congregationalism and 
transcendentalism, these men 
ultimately developed a concrete 
philosophy for the New World.” 
Ken Friedman, “Fluxus: A Lab-
oratory of Ideas,” in Fluxus and 
the Essential Questions of Life, 
ed. Jacquelynn Baas (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 
2011), 38.
30 Dewey, Experience and 
Nature, xv, 354–93. The meta-
phor had an impact. As a Google 
n-gram search indicates, usage of 
the term artwork took off in the 
early 1940s.
31 Ibid., 357.
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reception over productive impulse, while the industrial arts reversed this order. 
Dewey’s affection for the industrial arts percolates through his work. Pragmatism, 
in effect, models action on production. Producing an artwork requires creating one 
thing out of many, and entails an intense effort to unify divergent qualities and 
forces—including utility and beauty.  
Dewey, though, did little to explain how such powerful, interpenetrating 
blends come about. From time to time he discusses the imagination, but not its 
synthetic power. He observes that art—along with experience more generally—is 
obliged to forge unions of opposites. Necessity and freedom, the generic and the 
particular, the sensuous and the ideal, the predictable and the unexpected have 
to be coalesced. But he does not explain the mechanisms that make such solvent 
unions possible. In contrast, the classic Platonic-Aristotelian model does. For the 
most part, Dewey dismissed this. “The presence in art, whether as an act or a 
product, of proportion, economy, order, symmetry, composition,” he says at one 
point in Experience and Nature, “is such a commonplace that it does not need to be 
dwelt upon.”32 At the eleventh hour, in his later work Art as Experience,33 Dewey 
changed his mind on this point. In that book, he argues that rhythm and symmetry 
are important in achieving the unity in variety and the reconciliation of opposites 
that are necessary for a successful artwork.34 
In the decades after 1970, pragmatic epistemology was partly displaced by 
postmodern theories. Postmodernism rejected the idea that there is a unifying 
character to aesthetic experience. Dewey regarded aesthetic experience as a 
struggle—with means and parts—that resolves itself. The person who creates an 
artwork experiences flux, change, and disequilibrium. In time, though, these di-
vergent forces are unified in works that are fulfilling. For the practicing artist, the 
consummation of the artwork causes the phase of artistic disunity and conflicted 
identity to be superseded by a phase of creative unity and coherent identity. Post-
modern epistemologies typically suppose that flux, change, and conflict do not 
resolve themselves. There is no coherent identity, harmony, or equilibrium that 
crystallize in either the artwork or the artist’s experience. Rather, there is only re-
sistance, tension, disturbance, transformation, and conflict. The admired artwork is 
incomplete, ephemeral, confrontational, defiant, or disputatious. Consequently, the 
artist’s experience is dominated by suffering rather than doing. Beauty, harmony, 
and equilibrium have no place in this aesthetic epistemology. Centering is replaced 
by marginality, the whole by fragmented parts, loveliness by ugliness, long-lasting-
ness by transience, and fulfillment by dissatisfaction.
There is a parallel of this postmodern epistemology in Dewey’s Reconstruc-
tion in Philosophy.35 That book argues—at times vociferously—against the classical 
notion of aesthetic contemplation. Dewey rejects the idea of art or life that focuses 
on fixed ends or fixed forms. He argues that there is no room in modern life for 
finality, completion, or self-sufficiency. He rejects the Platonic-Aristotelian concepts 
of limits, finality, and happiness or satisfaction. Experience in modernity, he con-
tends, does not end in a state of stillness or restfulness. Rather than rest, it aspires 
to restless exploration. Its desire is not to attain perfection, but rather to ceaselessly 
find flaws in life and art and improve on them. The modern spirit advances rather 
than concludes. No matter how beautiful they might be, the artworks of contem-
plative epochs—he had classical antiquity in mind—end up repeating themselves. 
Their creators lack the impulse to invent, improve, experiment, or create novelties. 
To know something, Dewey contends, is to induce a change in it. Against the pref-
erence for permanent things, Dewey argues in favor of absence and instability.36 
The resemblance of this to postmodernism is unmistakable. The momentary, tran-
sient, and fleeting are eulogized. Alteration, becoming, and perishing are mobilized 
against the metaphysics of permanent being. Othering, diversity, and multiplicity 
32 Ibid., 359.
33 John Dewey, Art as Experi-
ence (1934; New York: Penguin, 
1980).
34 He also mentions, in passing, 
color complementarity—hues 
opposite each other on the color 
wheel—and aesthetic economy 
as mechanisms to achieve a 
unified and thus meaningful 
work.
35 John Dewey, Reconstruction 
in Philosophy, enlarged ed. 
(1948/1920; Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1957).
36 See in particular Dewey, 
Reconstruction in Philosophy, 
106–13.
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overshadow the unities of work, life, and identity.
In Experience and Nature—written nearly a decade later—Dewey’s vehemence 
for contingency disappears. Instead, he reflects on the paradoxical character of all 
things. He observes that “qualities have defects as necessary conditions of their 
excellences,” while “change gives meaning to permanence and recurrence makes 
novelty possible,” sounding for a moment like G.K. Chesterton.37 Aristotle, Dewey 
thought, was still at fault. But this was not because Aristotle ignored contingency. 
Rather, he was biased in favor of the fixed, certain, and finished.38 How, then, not 
to be biased? Dewey recommends abandoning the separation between contingency 
and necessity.39 He urges the creation of unions of incompletion and recurrence.40 
Fully formed experience requires people to move from a state of difference to one 
of unity—and from confusion to system.41
What is not clear from Dewey is how we might bridge such oppositions. How 
do we integrate and unify the opposing forces of rest and motion, striving and 
stability, opening and closing? These are not just philosophical questions. They 
are also practical design problems. The designer, like the philosopher, has three 
options: choose one side or the other—choose flux or continuity; blend the oppo-
sites—evoke stability with a strong accent of dynamism; or do as postmodern epis-
temologists recommend, and think of each dyadic opposition as a hierarchy—and 
then reverse the hierarchy.
Postmodern epistemologies began in the late 1960s as a reaction against struc-
turalism and its theory of binary oppositions. Claude Levi-Strauss, for example, 
concluded from the study of the myths and legends of hundreds of societies that 
human beings make sense of the world through the lenses of binary oppositions—
things like raw and cooked or moist and parched. Wendy Doniger neatly sums this 
up in her introduction to Lévi-Strauss’s Myth and Meaning when she says 
“Myth is a form of language, and language itself predisposes us to attempt to 
understand ourselves and our world by superimposing dialectics, dichotomies, 
or dualistic grids upon data that may in fact be entirely integrated. And under-
neath language lies the binary nature of the brain itself. Right and left, good 
and evil, life and death—these are inevitable dichotomies produced by the 
brain that has two lobes and controls two eyes, two hands. We are split crea-
tures literally by nature, and we organize data like a simple digital machine. 
Our common sense is binary; the simplest and most efficient way to process 
experience seems to be by dividing it in half, and then to divide the halves in 
half, reformulating every question so that there are only two possible answers 
to it, yes or no.”42
What structuralism missed, however, was the connective element—the use of form 
and metaphor, pattern and paradox, to pass between those oppositions. Post-struc-
turalism, on the other hand, held that binary oppositions were hierarchies that 
merited reversal.43 Binaries implied preferences for one polarity over another. This 
meant an untoward preference for men rather women, speech rather than writing, 
the center rather than the margins, the West rather than the East, and so on. 
Post-structuralism sought to invert these polarities. That also implied that the dark 
should be preferred to the light and evil to good. 
The premise of structuralism—binary opposition—obscured the mechanisms 
of the imagination that translate the terms of one binary into another via analogic 
and pattern thinking. Creation that is enacted via the imagination is non-dual-
istic or non-binary in nature. It is an interweaving, interpenetrating process that 
involves, as Natasha Lushetich puts it, perpetual mutual structuration and the 
cross-pollination of numerous forces and factors.44 According to Lushetich, it oper-
ates paradoxically. It preserves thesis and antithesis in tension and thereby creates 
37 Dewey, Experience and 
Nature, 47.
38 Ibid., 48.
39 Ibid., 58.
40 Ibid., 62.
41 Ibid., 66.
42 Wendy Doniger, introduction 
to Myth and Meaning: Cracking 
the Code of Culture, by Claude 
Lévi-Strauss (1978; Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 
1995), viii–ix. 
43 “An opposition of metaphys-
ical concepts (speech/writing, 
presence/absence, etc.) is never 
the face-to-face of two terms, 
but a hierarchy and an order of 
subordination.” Jacques Derrida, 
Monolingualism of the Other, 
or, the Prothesis of Origin, trans. 
Patrick Mensah, 2nd ed. (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 
1998), 195; “In a traditional philo-
sophical opposition we have not 
a peaceful coexistence of facing 
terms but a violent hierarchy. 
One of the terms dominates 
the other (axiologically, logically, 
etc.), occupies the commanding 
position. To deconstruct the 
opposition is above all, at a 
particular moment, to reverse 
the hierarchy.” Jacques Derrida, 
Positions, trans. Alan Bass 
(Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1981), 41.
44 Natasha Lushetich, Fluxus: 
The Practice of Non-duality 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2014), 8. 
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bi-conditional relations—what Koestler called bisociations—in place of binary 
oppositions. This involves a transpositional framing in which polar opposites 
become co-implicative rather than separated.45 A classic example from science is 
the quantum particle that behaves in certain circumstances like a wave. 
Design routinely exhibits such cross-pollinations—consider the light beer 
bottle designed to resemble a light bulb, or the ketchup bottle designed to look 
like a stack of sliced tomatoes. The imagination is a type of cognitive stretching. 
More ordinary designs associate near concepts, such as the trash can/recycle bin 
icon used to represent deleted file storage on your computer. While functional, it 
is not especially imaginative. The more imagination applied, the more distant the 
conceptual associations. A graphic artist designs a cigarette-in-hand to cast a gun-in-
hand shadow—these two, both killers, are not that remote. Then there is the design 
image of a loaf of bread cut to look uncannily like a shoe—these two are a bit fur-
ther removed from each other. An image combining a necktie with a noose melds 
the sensations of life and death—these are still further removed. The more suc-
cessful the merging of the polarities, and at the same time the greater the distance 
between those polarities, the more profound the act of imagination becomes—and 
the more difficult it is to pull off. 
Imagination and Explanation
Our ability to thread oppositions together in productive ways is central to our 
human identity. As John Locke observed, identity is the durable part of the human 
personality.46 No functional identity can be created out of one single psycholog-
ical pole, even if that pole is fashionably subaltern. Successful identity formation 
requires each person to create a durable ratio between polar opposites. Action 
and reflection, concreteness and abstraction, introversion and sociability, past and 
present, present and future, and so on, all have to be synthesized. Postmodernism 
turned away sharply from this kind of imaginative synthesis and replaced it with 
an emphasis on fragmentation and difference, collage and hybridity. That turn was 
followed by a gusto for upending hierarchical binaries—in other words, reversing 
their polarity by inverting what were presumed to be the negative, subordinate, or 
oppressed poles of social and aesthetic dyads.
Postmodern terminology dominates most contemporary aesthetic self-de-
scriptions. This is true even of the commercial art world. Dewey’s pragmatic model 
has by no means disappeared—it has become subterranean. Take the case of the 
universities. Today, public aesthetic works in design, art, and architecture are often 
created for exhibition under the umbrella of graduate research programs. This 
mode of operating expanded significantly in the postmodern era after 1970. As it 
grew, it adopted the concept of practice-based research.47 Correspondingly, the idea 
of a terminal, practitioner-style Master’s degree—undertaken principally for profes-
sional certification purposes—fell out of favor. The terminal degree did not possess 
the status of the research degree. But what, then, did research mean in the creative 
arts? One answer to this gnarly question was practice-based research. This was the 
idea that an aesthetic work combined with a textual exegesis of the work could 
satisfy the expectations of a Ph.D. or Master’s-level graduate program, or satisfy uni-
versity expectations for faculty research. 
A majority of doctoral exegeses and faculty articles produced today under the 
practice-based banner are conceived in broadly postmodern terms. In abstracts 
and catalog descriptions, the work is typically presented as defiant, discordant, 
or in some way disorderly. Inchoate, incomplete, mutable, fluid, and unstable are 
common terms used by practice-based researchers to describe their work. This 
would appear to take them out of the orbit of Dewey’s pragmatic epistemology. The 
45 Ibid., 18.
46 John Locke, “Identity and 
Diversity,” in An Essay Concern-
ing Human Understanding, ed. 
Roger Woolhouse (1689; London: 
Penguin, 1997), 296–314.
47 For multiple archived 
examples of practice-based 
thesis work as well as descrip-
tions and advocacy of this style 
of research, see the Creative 
Practice Research Portal https://
practice-research.com/.
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irony is that this is not at all the case. Rather, the aspirations for consummation 
have been simply displaced from the artwork of the practice-based researcher onto 
the Ph.D. or the published journal article. Instead of aesthetic consummation, we 
now have institutional consummation.48 In Dewey’s terms, the end-in-view to be 
achieved is the thesis or the article that couples exhibited design or artwork with 
exegetical commentary. The consummation of the design or art process is not, 
then, a work in which the whole is greater than the parts or the various means of 
artistic creation are seamlessly integrated—it is the institutional artwork-exegesis 
hybrid. This is the aesthetics of a bureaucratic world in which the end of art in all 
its manifestations is institutional recognition. The mandarin-style, high-status Ph.D. 
becomes the end-in-view of the practitioner. In the exegesis, the practitioner rep-
resents the work undertaken as subversive, destabilizing, undermining, disrupting, 
or dislocating. But the contextual end-in-view of the artwork or design work is the 
higher degree or the academic promotion. The end of the art, in other words, is 
an institutionally bestowed status and the economic rewards that flow from that 
status.
The means to this end—the artwork-exegesis Ph.D.—is a postmodern hybrid 
that barely hangs together. It displays little internal coherence or imaginative syn-
thesis. The thing that most often ties it together—if only minimally—is ideography. 
This is when the artwork and the commentary pivot on a biographical-style search 
for the authentic aesthetic self. Time and again, practice-based researchers present 
their work as a study in uniqueness. Common advice given to these researchers 
reinforces this ideography. It presents self-reflection as a mode of research. In this 
view, research is the external aesthetic expression of internalized, embodied, tacit 
knowledge. Research is normally nomothetic in nature. In this case, though, it is 
intensely idiographic.49 It is a self-proposition. 
In the case of research that is a self-proposition, the artistic self is the focus of 
inquiry. Both the creative work and the exegesis supposedly serve to reveal hidden, 
neglected, and covered-over layers of the self through a struggle with aesthetic 
themes, materials, and morphologies—or else with the surrounding oppressive 
society. This struggle, however, does not end in a Dewey-style consummation where 
divergent inputs are eventually unified into a coherent finished object before a 
new project is started. Instead, the true work remains relatively incomplete and, in 
some fundamental way, unconsummated. This means in effect that the partial, un-
finished, piecemeal, or inadequate work gains legitimacy as long as it can present 
itself as a revelatory self-proposition. 
The problem with this is that research is not an act of self-revelation—it is 
one of explanation. Research reasons, elucidates, and argues. Its primary media are 
papers, chapters, articles, books, and theses. The purpose of research is to explain 
natural, social, or aesthetic phenomena by giving systematic accounts of them. 
Extended written arguments, reasons, and deductions serve the purpose of expla-
nation. Practice-based researchers tend to treat written work as an afterthought. 
Interest is focused on mapping, collecting, exhibiting, capturing, or documenting 
practical work. Such materials may usefully illustrate a written work. But, in the 
case of research, illustration is not a substitute for explanation. Much of the moti-
vating impulse of practitioner Ph.D.s is exhibition or installation—not explanation. 
The write-up is an obligatory afterthought. 
The practice-based design researcher produces an artifact in the way that a sci-
entist conducts an experiment. In both cases, the practical work cannot constitute 
research until it is written up as a methodical intellectual explanation and defense 
of a claim. The argument sometimes made is that research can be communicated 
through constructions and fabrications in place of explanatory justifications, ex-
plications, and elucidations. But a construction or a fabrication—no matter how 
48 This is echoed in theories of 
art that treat art and artworks 
in terms of the milieu and 
institutions of art worlds. See 
Arthur C. Danto, The Transfig-
uration of the Commonplace: A 
Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1981; 
and Howard S. Becker, Art worlds 
(Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1982). 
49 The epistemological dis-
tinction between nomothetic 
and idiographic was introduced 
by the neo-Kantian philoso-
pher Wilhelm Windelband 
(1848–1915). 
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interesting or compelling it may be as an aesthetic object—is not research. Re-
search is not an act of cultural communication or aesthetic objectivation. Rather it 
is a very specific, tightly structured, elaborated act of explanation. 
In his Uses of Argument, the philosopher Stephen Toulmin developed a lucid 
model of how explanation works.50 Various kinds of reasons—principally grounds, 
claims, warrants, and backings—are deployed systematically. Explanation is not an 
act of self-presentation or self-proposition. It is not an authentication of the self. 
It does not exist to validate the self by uncovering its struggles with disintegrating 
meaning, centrifugal confusion, and what results from that: vertiginous aesthetic 
suffering. Explanation is centripetal. It even makes chaos seem more orderly. 
Human beings seek explanations when their world is disturbed in some way. Expla-
nations assure individuals that the world is meaningful. That is to say, even when 
bad things occur we look to reasons that help us make sense of what has happened 
by placing events and actions in a context of grounds, warrants, and backings. 
Many explanations turn out to be poor or feeble. Some are even delusional. 
But others are enlightening, elucidating, and clarifying. The quality of explana-
tions varies. But, good or bad, they are part of the way that human beings produce 
meaning. Meaning is the human faculty of putting one thing in terms of another. 
To take a very elementary example, the dictionary meaning of a word is its near-re-
semblance to other words. At the other end of the scale, imaginative meanings put 
things together that are very far apart—as in the case of anthropomorphic gods, or 
the mythological part-human part-beast. Meaning is the translation of one semantic 
unit—be it an image, shape, color, taste, touch, word, or concept—into another. In 
the act of generating meaning there is a passage between one unit and another. 
There are several meaning-generating cognitive processes. The most de-
manding of these—the imagination—creates a passage between antonyms. Passages 
also occur between closely related semantic units (synonyms). On the spectrum of 
meanings, explanations sit halfway between dictionary definitions and mythopo-
etic thoughts. They generate meaning by putting a thesis or claim in terms of some-
thing else, namely evidence—grounds, facts, and data. This also requires the person 
explaining things to produce (if pressed) a warrant. Warrants justify putting one 
thing—a claim—in terms of something different—grounds. At times, warranting 
the cognitive leap between thesis and evidence can be difficult. In those cases, war-
rants have to be supported by backings that warrant the warrants. 
In each of these steps—from claim to evidence to warrant to backing—the 
terms of one thing is translated into the terms of another thing. The following is an 
example from Toulmin’s Uses of Argument.
Thesis I am a British citizen.  
Evidence I was born in Bermuda. 
Warrant Persons born in Bermuda are by law British citizens. 
Backing I am a solicitor and I know the law.51 
Reasoning, or explanation, is a way of connecting words and thoughts. In Toulmin’s 
example, a lattice-like pattern of connection emerges between the sentences. The 
terms British citizen, Bermuda, and law tie the tiers of sentences together. Explana-
tions become full-fledged arguments when they are questioned. Other persons 
rebut the argument. Rebuttals are then followed by qualifications that expand the 
argument and deal with the rebuttals. To understand how this applies to an art-
work or design work, consider the following example. 
Thesis Light beer=light bulb images are creative works.52  
Evidence They fuse the ambiguous concept of light—light in weight and light in 
50 Stephen E. Toulmin, The 
Uses of Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 
1958). See also Stephen Toulmin, 
Richard D. Rieke and Allan Janik, 
An Introduction to Reasoning 
(New York: Macmillan, 1978).
51 Bermudians are British 
Overseas Territory citizens by 
birth.
52 For example, see Incandes-
cent Lightbulb with Beer Inside 
Isolated over White, https://www.
shutterstock.com/image-photo/
incandescent-lightbulb-beer-in-
side-isolated-over-28629799. The 
creator, Trinacria Photography, 
is the Schenectady NY-based 
husband and wife team of 
Vincent and Fran Giordano. 
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illumination. 
Warrant Language and thought contain many ambidextrous words whose 
double meaning allows us to associate things that are normally remote from 
each other.  
Backing Ricoeur discusses the polysemy of language in The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur (see Chapter nine).53 
Rebuttal But that’s just language! You are confusing design with poetics. 
Qualification 1 The photographic metaphor is a visual metaphor not a linguistic 
one.  
Warrant Metaphors—visual, linguistic, haptic, and auditory—meld two or more 
frames of reference. 
Backing Barbara Stratford’s Visual Analogy explains this, so does Koestler in his 
Act of Creation. 
Qualification 2 The light beer=light bulb image turns white light into white 
froth above amber liquid, and the bulb’s grey steel fitting into the foot of a 
glass bulb-styled tumbler. 
Warrant Pattern-forms integrate contrasts into meaningful units. Light-
er-darker, steel-glass, foam-liquid, liquid-solid are organized into a well-pro-
portioned contrastive structure made up of a tripartite, tightly-coiled metallic 
base, an unfolding-expanding liquid middle, and a receding globe-like spher-
ical head. 
Backing The theory of antithetical qualities and forces interwoven via the media 
of ratio and proportionality begins with the Pre-Socratics. Plato and Aristotle 
take it up in different ways. Over the 2,500 years that have followed, there have 
been numerous political, social, economic, and aesthetic applications of the 
theory.
What we have just seen is the way an argument develops. In this simple example, 
one rebuttal has produced multiple qualifications that, in turn, generate further 
evidence, warrants, and backings for the initial claim. Readers, I am sure, can 
imagine for themselves multiple other rebuttals. Those rebuttals would then serve 
to expand the argument still further. Just as, in the same way, further qualifications 
to the original explanation can be added. For example 
Qualification 3 The shape of the beer-bulb resembles an upside-down An-
glo-Saxon beaker from 600 AD. 
Qualification 4 The shape of an electric-light-beer-bulb is the analog of a plant 
bulb. Both contain food or nutrition. 
And so goes explanation, on and on and on—the point being that academic articles 
are composed of thousands of words. Books and theses are made up of multiple 
tens of thousands of words. Research entails reasoning on a large-scale. It rests on 
an elaborate architecture of evidence, warrants, and backings. This means that 
a research thesis, article, or book cannot just be a study in self-revelation or the 
description of a design or art procedure. The collection, exhibition, and documen-
tation of creative artifacts, likewise, lack the explanatory structure of research. 
Descriptive labels in exhibitions or documentary voice-overs do not provide expla-
nations in the sense of claims, evidence, warrants, and backings. That is not their 
function or role.
At the same time, warrants and backings provide a good opportunity to bridge 
the gap between reason and aesthesis. Design works can be reasoned about histor-
ically or socio-scientifically. But what about artistically? Arguably the best design 
research reasons about the “design-i-ness” of design. Just as Paul Ricoeur anchored 
53 Paul Ricoeur, “Creativity 
in Language: Word, Polysemy, 
Metaphor,” in The Philosophy of 
Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His 
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explanations about the nature of speech and writing in characterizations of the 
polysemy of language, the most compelling design research is able to anchor its 
explanations in warrants or backings that set out the deep-seated structural princi-
ples and aesthetic forms and shapes that underpin design work. If legal knowledge 
provides warrants and backings for explanations and arguments about citizenship, 
then aesthetic concepts—such as balance, alignment, repetition, contrast—play a 
similar role in design explanations. A commercial firm pitching to a client might 
rely on atmospheric labels to communicate the idea behind a design project. But 
in research, the act of explanation is necessarily built on design’s fundamental, 
essential, and elemental pattern thinking. Whatever its circumlocutions, compel-
ling design research, like design work, begins and ends in pattern recognition and 
cognition.54
Design Research
Good explanation in the sciences and the arts always has a point. There is some-
thing specific to be explained. In the case of design, it is the creative act or process. 
The primary objective of design research is to make explicit the obscure workings 
of the imagination. It explains how striking and interesting visual objects and ar-
rangements are produced via forms and metaphors and related phenomena. When 
we look at a successful design, the intuitive part of our brain lights up. We recog-
nize a visual paradox or diagrammatic metaphor without necessarily being able to 
explain it or explain how the work was created. We just enjoy it for its enigmatic 
or puzzle-like power. Research, on the other hand, has to explain how the work 
was created, how the brain interprets it, and so on. It does this via a multi-layered 
pattern of reasoning. 
Exegetical texts that lack systematic, large-scale structures of explanation end 
in waffle. Recognizable art terms, concepts, vocabularies, jargons, and nomencla-
tures are used. Strung together, they make little sense. This is because they are not 
woven into the cascading, lattice-like structural form of an argument. In serious 
work, such forms may extend from fifty to a hundred thousand words. To do this 
successfully requires great architectonic discipline. That said, there is a demand 
for artists and designers who can label their works, and that demand continues to 
grow. It follows Arthur Danto’s dictum that art is whatever the art world says it is.55 
Nowadays, anything that is theorized as art becomes art. Design firms attach tags, 
brochures, descriptors, categorizations, and classifications to their work. Documen-
tary tickets, plaques, signs, inscriptions, plates, panels, manifestos, declarations, 
programs, catalogs, and leaflets mediate between the designed artifact and the 
customer, and between the artwork and the world. A language game has grown to 
service this need. It is largely conceptual in nature. It draws heavily on art school 
theories. Nevertheless, the language game of art documentation is not explana-
tion, nor is the equivalent language game of practice-as-research that some design 
schools play (under different rubrics, including “practice-based research”). These 
do not function as explanation does—that is, through the medium of elaborated, 
well-structured justifications, reasoning, critiques, defenses, and arguments.
Design, like art and architecture, does not need explanation to work.56 We 
do not have to have the reasons why the Parthenon is captivating or a Cézanne 
painting is absorbing explained to us. We do not need someone to spell out the rea-
sons why Massimo Vignelli’s classic 1970s NYC transit map is a visually compelling 
abstraction, or Paul Rand’s logos for ABC and UPS were instantly memorable, or 
Alexey Brodovitch’s kinetic artwork for Harper’s Bazaar brought its magazine pages 
alive. Explanation, well done, can add to our enjoyment of those objects and to our 
understanding of things that are interesting, exciting, or important in life. But if 
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things are explained, they need to be well explained. That means that the write-up 
of the creative process has to match the imaginative act embodied in a successful 
design object. That is a tall order. It requires imagination in the act of design cre-
ation and imagination in the act of writing. Not many people achieve both. In my 
experience, good writers are usually poor designers, and vice-versa. 
As Ken Friedman observes, the exposure to explanatory writing is least 
common in the Anglo-Australian and Continental European systems of design ed-
ucation.57 North American undergraduate design students tend to get more expo-
sure to the discipline of writing because of the greater number of general studies 
subjects in their degrees. Writing on an extended scale is essential to research, 
which includes arts research. The key is that writing is a durable external object 
that can be rebutted. Rebuttal is neither a kind of art criticism nor is it a corrective 
master-apprentice dialogue. After two millennia, we still rebut and defend, qualify 
and extend the arguments of Aristotle and Plato. This is the way we advance knowl-
edge. Knowledge is not an expression of the soul. It is the fruit of claim and count-
er-claim, refutation and justification.
That being said, not all writing is explanatory. Most of it is not. Writing also 
describes, labels, documents, tags, categorizes, identifies, depicts, and communi-
cates without engaging in the kind of elaborated argument that is characteristic 
of research. Contemporary design firms and organizations place a lot of value on 
the documentary labeling of artifacts. Undergraduate programs in art and design 
schools mirror this expectation. Labeling draws heavily on the art theories and con-
cepts taught in the programs of art and design schools. But the categorization and 
classification of a designed artifact or an artwork—no matter how atmospheric this 
might be—is not the same as explanation of a research kind. The modest research 
essay in an undergraduate program is the first step toward structured, disciplined, 
and elaborated explanations. This is followed by minor and then major disserta-
tions. On this continuum, the Ph.D. scales explanatory reasoning to the length of a 
book, a work of formidable magnitude. 
This is not to suppose that all writers are good writers. In fact, much expla-
nation is sterile because it lacks imagination. It fails to interpolate into discursive 
reasoning vivid pattern contrasts, metaphors, paradoxes, ironies, and so on. What 
results, then, is discursive writing that is bland, lame, and unilluminating. Such 
writing can follow along a chain of argument successfully, yet not reveal anything 
significant about the world. This also reminds us that discourse is not the same as 
discovery. In the act of discovery is buried the act of creation. We discover things by 
making leaps of imagination that we simultaneously anchor within the explanatory 
framework of reason. Discursive reason presupposes premises. If the premises are 
uninteresting then so will be the conclusions. Interesting premises require a vivid 
imagination. The imagination sees paradoxes, contrasts that resemble each other, 
and points of comparison that act as connecting tissue. In short, to work well, 
explanations need a spark of imagination—a leavening of pattern contrasts and 
metaphoric similitudes. Reason ends up being sterile unless it is able to interpolate 
rich, productive, and illuminating contrastive-resemblances into its discursive and 
explanatory structures. 
Without the interpolating of imagination into reason, reason lacks the power 
of illumination. It casts shadows where there should be light. Stripped of the par-
adoxical structure of contrast-and-likeness, research of all kinds frequently fails. It 
does so because it separates imaginative thinking from discursive reasoning. In the 
case of practice-based research, the imagination is typically exiled to the artistic ar-
tifact. In this case, imagination is supposed to be confined to the artistic or design 
object. It is expatriated outside of the written work. 
Design research has a purpose—to explain creation. Practice-based design 
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research tends to substitute description for explanation. Exegeses often describe 
at some length the operations that led to the making of a design artifact—whether 
it was digital or physical, what materials were used, what technologies were em-
ployed, what the steps in the production of the artifact were, what the artifact was 
trying to communicate, what design traditions or figures or theories (minimalism, 
for example) influenced the artifact-idea, and so on. Such descriptions, to differing 
degrees, may be interesting—but none of them explain the act of creation. None 
of them explain via an extended argument the imaginative process lying behind 
the design work or activity. None of them elaborate via a compelling architecture 
of reasons, rebuttals, justifications, and refutations the hows and whys of the de-
signer’s act of creation anchored in an act of visual irony, paradox, metaphor, witty 
incongruity, interstitial contrariety, ingenious symmetry, or any other of the many 
kinds of contrastive-resemblances that lie beneath human creation and fuel the 
powerhouse of the human imagination. 
Suppose that one of the chapters of a design Ph.D. is a methodology chapter. 
In light of that, the question arises: what methods are most fertile for creative 
design research? The parallel field of music provides a guide. There, the most 
successful studies by artists use structural methods of analysis. Aaron Copeland’s 
What to Listen For in Music and Igor Stravinsky’s Poetics of Music are cases in point.58 
The oldest systemic method of creative research is the statistical analysis of bi-
ographical data.59 The least useful methods are self-interpretations.60 These are 
subject-centered self-descriptions based on introspection, recollection, and self-re-
porting. The artist’s motives, planning, expressive drive, self-understanding, and 
experiential feelings are common themes. Self-descriptions—especially of the ways 
that artists suffer the world or operationally plan their art—are foregrounded. 
Explanations of the structural characteristics of the artwork recede into the back-
ground. Strategies of introspection, the interrogation of the self, scrutiny of one’s 
own thought emerge as common research techniques,61 along with responses to 
felt needs and urges to create.62 Self-critical awareness, monitoring of self-progress 
in the creative process, self-reflexivity, self-fashioning, self-portraits,63 alongside 
self-reflexive mapping, the private-self enacting the world, maps of subjectivity, 
self-addressing, autobiographical memoir, self-research, self-narrative, and so on—
all are examples of idiographic techniques.64 The focus is on the designer, not the 
design work. 
Structural methods of analysis align most closely with theories of creation.65 
This is because acts of imagination—the most potent medium of aesthetic cre-
ation—are structural in nature. They bridge between antitheses. The most crucial 
task of a design researcher is to identify which of the many models of creation best 
accounts for—in an explanatory rather than descriptive fashion—the structural 
act of imagination interpolated in the design artifacts, processes, or phenomena 
chosen by the researcher for analysis. Whether the design objects are the research-
er’s own or not, the same norm applies. What act of creation best explains the 
design work? Is its imaginative substratum configurative, metaphorical, ironic, hu-
morous, or what? How does such a creative medium operate? What are its essential 
characteristics? How are those characteristics manifest in the design work, process, 
or phenomenon studied by the researcher? 
In short, the overriding purpose of design research is to analyze acts of cre-
ation and explain how they work. How is one cognitive frame of reference bolted 
onto a different one to generate the kind of memorable, absorbing, intriguing, 
attention-grabbing, or uncanny effect typical of the successful creative act? Such 
explanations are difficult because the act of creation is obscure.66 The workings of 
the imagination are opaque—not least of all to the practicing designer. The same 
is true of writers. Many explain their best work with the statement that “God took 
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over and did the writing through me”—a metaphor for the hidden structural op-
erations of the imagination.67 Designers at their peak, like writers at their best, 
typically work fast—so fast that the workings of their imaginations appear to be 
automatic. Creation just pours out of them. 
If the principal role of design research is to analyze acts of creation and ex-
plain how they work, then, schematically, the plan of a design Ph.D. would look 
something like this:
First, the research question: how does design Y creatively treat A in terms of 
contra-A?  
Second, the review: how have similar creative design problems previously been 
solved? 
Third, the methodology: what structural theories best explain how to coalesce 
A and contra-A? 
Fourth, the substance: in Y, what new solution is introduced to coalesce A and 
contra-A?
The new solution may draw on the researcher’s own design experiments or prac-
tice—or on a larger body of experiment and practice. But these trials and investi-
gations are not synonymous with the substance of a design Ph.D., any more than 
a scientist’s lab work or experimental notes constitute the explanatory substance 
of a science Ph.D. Practice, trial-and-error, and artistic experimentation, along with 
exhibition and installation, are not explanatory. They are things to be explained. 
In short, they are the explanandum not the explanans of design research.68 The fatal 
temptation of practice-based research in the postmodern era, mesmerized as it was 
by the inversion of binaries, was to reverse explanandum and explanans. In doing so, 
it rendered explanation—the very point of research—null and void.
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